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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Connor Spies appeals from the district court's appellate decision reversing the 
magistrate court's order to suppress evidence and remanding the case for further 
proceedings. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
During a routine traffic stop on July 15, 2011, officers found marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia in Spies' possession. (R., p.26.) Because Spies was under the age of 18 
at the time of the traffic stop, the state charged him as a juvenile with violating curfew, 
destruction or concealment of evidence, possession of paraphernalia, possession of 
marijuana, and resisting and obstructing arrest (R., pp.5-7.) Spies moved to suppress 
the evidence, arguing that the search and seizure violated his constitutional rights. (R., 
pp.25-28.) The magistrate held a hearing on the motion (R., pp.33-40) and made the 
following factual findings, which were later adopted by the district court: 
1. At approximately 1: 1 0 am on July 15, 2011, Officer Hoodman stopped 
the Former Juvenile's vehicle near the intersection of Ustick and 
Meridian Roads in Ada County, Idaho; 
2. The basis of the stop by Officer Hoodman was for suspicion of an 
intoxicated or impaired driver; 
3. Officer Hoodman observed the Former Juvenile's vehicle on two (2) 
occasions northbound on Ustick Road merge from the far right 
temporary lane into the main lane of travel by 'swerving' abruptly and 
without using turn signals; However, Officer Hoodman testified he did 
not base the stop of the subject vehicle on the lack of turn signals; 
4. Officer Hoodman explained he was also suspicious of the driver's 




leaving , the of of 
Both the main lane of travel and merge lane were marked by 
reflective tabs, three to four inches in height; 
6. The main lane of travel, northbound was marked on both sides with 
yellow tabs, the merger lane was marked with yellow tabs; 
7. The Former Juvenile was otherwise operating his vehicle in 
compliance with the motor vehicle laws; 
8. There were some street lights near the intersection and sidewalks at 
the intersections of Ustickl12th and UsticklBlairmore; 
9. The sky was dark and clear during the time of the encounter and 
stop .... 
(R., pp.45-46; 96-97.) The magistrate, finding no basis for the traffic stop, ultimately 
granted the suppression motion (R., pp.44-48) and dismissed the case (R., p.51). 
The state appealed the magistrate's decision to the district court. (R., pp.53-54.) 
After briefing from the parties (R., pp.66-78; 88-94), the district court reversed the 
magistrate's ruling and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the traffic stop 
was objectively reasonable due to Spies' failure to signal. (R., pp.96-103.) Spies filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.1 05-06.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Spies states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was the Magistrate correct in ruling that the failure to use a turn 
signal was not and need not be included in the basis of the stop. 
2. Was the Magistrate's finding that the Former's [sic] Juvenile's 
driving fell with [sic] the broad range of normal driving behavior 
supported by substantial evidence. 
3. Is Idaho Code § 49-808 unconstitutional as applied to Connor's 
driving conduct. 
(Appel/ant's brief, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Spies failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision reversing 
the magistrate court's order suppressing evidence and remanding for further 
proceedings? 
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The Magistrate's Order To Suppress Evidence 
Introduction 
In the magistrate court below, Spies filed a motion to suppress evidence (R., 
pp.25-28), which was granted by that court (R., pp.44-48). The state appealed to the 
district court (R., pp.53-54), and the district court reversed (R., pp.96-103). On appeal, 
Spies argues that the district court erred in its determination. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-9.) 
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows no 
error by the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's decision." State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. 
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)). When a decision on a motion to 
suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that 
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 
739,741 (2007). 
C. The Traffic Stop Was Objectively Reasonable 
Below, Spies argued that there was no legitimate basis for his traffic stop. (R., 
pp.92-94.) The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that H[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic 
stop is analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a traffic stop is more 
similar to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. 
App. 2003). "An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific 
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is 
about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981 )). 
Therefore, when an officer observes a traffic violation, initiating a traffic stop is 
reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). 
In this case, Officer Hoodman testified that he observed Spies repeatedly fail to 
engage his turn signal before merging from terminating turn lanes back to the continuing 
lane of travel. (Tr., p.10, L.9 - p.12, L.12.) The magistrate specifically found that Spies 
moved from the temporary lane of travel to the continuing lane "without using turn 
signals." (R., p.45-46.) Signaling when merging left or right from one lane of travel to 
another is required by Idaho Code § 49-808. The traffic stop was therefore legitimate, 
based on Officer Hoodman's actual observation of Spies' traffic violation. Because the 
traffic stop was legal, the district court correctly reversed the magistrate's order 
suppressing the evidence. 
On appeal, Spies argues that the stop must be justified by the officer's subjective 
rationale for conducting the traffic investigation. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-5.) That is not 
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an 
a IS an objective test not on the subjective beliefs of an 
individual officer. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) 
(citing Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998)). Spies' failure to 
signal while repeatedly swerving between lanes is an objective violation of Idaho Code 
§ 49-808. Whether he subjectively believed so or not, as a matter of law-and as 
correctly concluded by the district court-Officer Hoodman objectively had reasonable 
suspicion to stop Spies for his traffic violation. 
Even if the standard required the Court to review Officer Hoodman's subjective 
basis for pulling over Spies (which it does not), there were sufficient facts to conclude 
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to enforce the traffic stop. Officer Hoodman 
testified that he pulled over Spies for suspicion of driving while intoxicated. (Tr., p.6, 
Ls.21-25.) Officer Hoodman observed Spies driving down temporary lanes of travel and 
abruptly swerving to the other lane of travel when those temporary lanes ended. (Tr., 
p.11, L2 - p.12, L.5.) As correctly noted by the district court, if swerving within the 
same lane of travel is abnormal driving behavior, see State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 
561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996), then swerving back and forth between two 
lanes of travel undoubtedly constitutes abnormal driving behavior. (R., pp.102-03.) 
Officer Hoodman also explained that, in his experience, intoxicated drivers leave bars 
late at night and hug the right side of the lane of travel, as Spies was doing. (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.8-25.) An officer may rely on his experience when forming reasonable suspicion. 
See State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004) ("An officer 
may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those 
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inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training.") 
hugging the right side of the road late at night, which indicated to Officer 
Hoodman that Spies could be drunk, coupled with Spies' abruptly swerving from the 
right side of the road to the continuing lane of travel, gave Officer Hoodman sufficient 
reasonable suspicion to pull over Spies for driving while intoxicated 
Spies next argues that Idaho Code § 49-808 is void for vagueness and contends 
that his not using "a turn signal should not ... be considered a 'failure' to do so" because 
"[h]e was not required to do so by a constitutionally valid statute." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.5-7.) Spies' argument fails. First, this Court should decline to address the issue. 
"Idaho case law requires that the party asserting an issue seek a specific ruling on that 
issue at each stage of the appeal." Rammell v. Idaho State Dept. of Agriculture, 147 
Idaho 415,421,210 P.3d 523,529 (2009) (superseded on other grounds by statute). 
"This Court will not address an issue not raised before the district court sitting in its 
appellate capacity." Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 10, 205 P.3d 650, 659 
(2009). Spies never raised a "void for vagueness" challenge to Idaho Code § 49-808 
before the district court sitting in its appellate capacity. The issue is therefore not 
preserved and this Court should not address it on appeal. 
Second, even if the issue were preserved, Spies' argument fails. Though Spies' 
Due Process claim might arguably constitute a defense to the traffic infraction of failing 
to signal, it is entirely irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry of whether Officer 
Hoodman had an objectively reasonable basis to enforce a traffic stop. As Spies has 
failed to cite any authority for his underlying premise that an officer may not detain a 
suspect upon reasonable suspicion that he or she has committed a crime merely 
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not 
P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
mayan 
on appeal. 1 
Finally, even on the merits, Spies' argument fails. The constitutionality of a 
statute is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review. Doe I v. Doe, 
138 Idaho 893, 903, 71 P.3d 1040, 1050 (2003). "A statute may be void for vagueness 
if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the 
conduct it proscribes, or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." State v. Fluewelling, 150 Idaho 
576, 578, 249 P.3d 375, 377 (2011) (quoting State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 
P.3d 126, 132 (2003)). "A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its 
face or as applied to a defendant's conduct." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712,69 P.3d at 132. 
"A 'facial vagueness' analysis," however, "is mutually exclusive from an 'as applied' 
analysis" ~ (citation omitted). "It has long been held that a statute should not be held 
void for uncertainty if any practical interpretation can be given the statute." State v. 
Larsen, 135 Idaho 754,756,24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001). 
Spies specifically "urges the court to consider" a facial challenge to Idaho Code § 
49-808. (Appellant's brief p.6.) "For a facial vagueness challenge to be successful, the 
complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications. In other words, the challenger must show that the enactment is invalid in 
toto." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712,69 P.3d at 132 (quotations and citation omitted). The 
Court held in Burton v. Department of Transportation that, in circumstances where one 
of the two lanes of travel ends and the other continues, Idaho Code § 49-808 "plainly 
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uires a sig because a driver in the terminating lane in order 
travel on the highway, and changing lanes constitutes a move to the left or 
right." 149 Idaho 746,749,240 P.3d 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2010). The statute is therefore 
not invalid in toto and Spies' facial challenge fails. 
Spies also asserts that Idaho Code § 49-808 is "at least void as applied to [his] 
driving." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) "To succeed on an as applied vagueness challenge, a 
complainant must show that the statute, 'as applied' to the defendant's conduct, failed to 
provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide 
sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining whether 
to arrest him." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. Spies does not support his 
naked assertion that the statute is void as applied to his conduct and so has failed to 
show that the statute failed to provide adequate notice that swerving back and forth 
between terminating lanes and a continuing lane of travel without using a signal was 
proscribed, or that it failed to provide sufficient guidelines for enforcement. 
Furthermore, this is the very situation which, as noted above, the Court in Burton held 
"plainly requires a signal" under Idaho Code § 49-808. 149 Idaho at 749, 240 P.3d at 
936. Spies' as-applied challenge also fails. 
Officer Hoodman observed Spies repeatedly violate Idaho Code § 49-808 by 
failing to signal before merging from terminating lanes of travel back to the continuing 
lane of travel as plainly required by Idaho Code § 49-808. Based on this actual 
observation of an actual violation, Officer Hoodman had reasonable suspicion to pull 
over Spies. The traffic stop was therefore valid, and the district court correctly reversed 
the magistrate's order suppressing the evidence. 
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respectfully requests d court's 
reversing the magistrate's order suppressing evidence and remanding this 
case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 20th day of February, 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of February, 2014, served two true 
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N. GENE ALEXANDER 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
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Boise, 1083702 
Deputy Attomey General 
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